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ABSTRACT
In the last few decades xenophobic and extreme right‑wing 
political movements have become increasingly strong electoral 
forces in many European countries. The Nordic countries have 
long been viewed as among the most tolerant countries in the 
world, with exemplary protection of minorities. Nevertheless, in 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, xenophobic parties also 
moved into first place during the past decade. Both national and 
international laws require governments to protect people against 
discriminatory treatment, but developing effective policies to cope 
with discrimination requires a clear understanding of the factors 
that trigger xenophobia. Despite a substantial body of cross‑
national research on the subject, the causes continue to be debated. 
The article reviews the relevant evidence in an effort to move closer 
to a clear understanding of causes of xenophobia, particularly in 
reference to the Nordic countries. Social identity theories, group 
threat theories, theories of nationalism and value theories all provide 
us with potentially useful cognitive explanations of xenophobia. To 
explain the perceived increase of xenophobic sentiments requires 
a dynamic theory of value change. The article draws on all these 
approaches, concluding that relatively secure people tend to be more 
tolerant than less secure once. Summing them up, I conclude that 
existential security/insecurity is the major cause of non‑xenophobic/
xenophobic attitudes. To test this hypothesis I utilize the data of the 
World Value Survey project, which covers all the Nordic countries 
over fifteen years. First, I compare the results of elections to the
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National Parliaments with the dynamics of xenophobic and non‑
xenophobic (tolerant) attitudes in these countries. Second, I perform 
a correlation between a society’s GDP per capita at various times in 
the past and attitudes toward ethnic immigrants in Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, and Finland. Based on the resulting findings, the article 
concludes that the massive surge of votes for xenophobic parties 
in the Nordic countries might seem to imply that it reflected an 
equally massive surge of xenophobic attitudes but this was not the 
case. Xenophobic attitudes showed the opposite trend. Xenophobic 
attitudes are more heavily shaped by the levels of insecurity one 
experience during one’s formative years, which occurred several 
decades before the survey.
KEYWORDS
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Why Worry about Xenophobia?
The people of Western societies generally claim to favor equality and opportunity for 
all. But since the 1990s, xenophobic, deeply conservative and extreme right‑wing 
political movements have emerged as increasingly strong electoral forces in much 
of Europe. The 2014 elections to the European Parliament saw a dramatic surge of 
support for xenophobic, authoritarian and anti‑Europe political parties: these parties 
gaining a record‑breaking 52 seats, a major gain over the 37 seats that they won in 
the 2009 elections (European Parliament, 2014).
The Nordic countries have long been viewed as among the most tolerant 
countries in the world, with exemplary protection of minorities. Nevertheless in 
Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Norway (The Progress Party), Sweden (Sweden 
Democrats), and Finland (The Finns Party), xenophobic and anti‑European parties 
also moved into first place, winning a large share of the vote than the major parties 
that have governed these countries for decades.
Because of xenophobic attitudes held by individuals in strategic positions, 
immigrants are widely perceived as an “outgroup” and discriminated against in the 
labour or housing markets (Rydgren, 2004). The expansion of xenophobic beliefs 
threatens the democratic structures of Western countries and may lead to their 
political destabilization. Moreover, increasing xenophobia is undermining support 
for the European Union.
As a complex social phenomenon, xenophobia exists at two levels. At its 
“private‑domain” level, xenophobia is an excessive fear of those who are different 
from oneself. This level is essential; therefore, generally xenophobia has been defined 
as a fear of “others”. At the “public‑domain” level, fears manifest themselves as 
a dislike or hatred of a particular group of people, such as foreign immigrants. These 
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fears often are given some plausible rationalization. Thus, van der Veer, Yakusko, 
Ommundsen, and Higler (2011) identify five kinds of rationalization that people use to 
explain their fear of foreign migrants. For instance, people may say that they dislike 
them because they fear migrants’ “political disloyalty” or they do not want to “lose 
their cultural identity.”
From an objective point of view, these xenophobic beliefs are often irrational, 
because of their incongruence with reality. In the distant past, in hunting and 
gathering societies or early agrarian societies, “xenophobia could be realistic 
under conditions where it literally was a question of one tribe or other surviving. 
For example, under conditions where there was just enough land to support one 
tribe, and another tribe comes along” (Inglehart, 2017, p. 21). Today, xenophobia 
departs from the behavioral norms of civilized society, in which people are expected 
to relate with one another with respect and dignity. Xenophobia can have severe 
negative consequences. On the individual level, it brings psychological trauma to its 
victims. On the societal level, xenophobic attitudes may lead to increasing crimes 
rates and intensification of intergroup and intercultural conflicts that threaten social 
stability. On the economic level, it may bring destruction of property and can scare 
away potential foreign investors. Finally, in international politics level xenophobia 
tends to produce a negative image of the offending group or country. Given these 
undesirable consequences of xenophobia, the question arises: Why do people 
engage in xenophobic behavior even in the world’s richest countries in times largely 
free of armed conflicts, natural disasters and poverty?
Interpretations of Xenophobia in Contemporary Social Theories
To answer this question we need to understand the causal chain that leads to 
prejudice and overt xenophobia. Various theories scrutinize the issue of international 
migration, such as theories of nation and nationalism, group threat/competition 
theories, theories of social identity, theories of value and value change.
A review of these theoretical approaches provides us with an insight that 
xenophobic attitudes usually (1) have objective sources and triggers; (2) are spread 
among particular groups of people and (3) can be observed in particular periods of 
time (Appendix, Table 1).
Most scholars agree that people’s attitude toward immigrants is closely linked 
with the presence of ethnically different newcomers in their immediate environment. 
This happens because xenophobia is a phenomenon of interpersonal and intergroup 
interaction and thus, links with the issue of ingroup/outgroup demarcation where 
perceiving immigrants as an outgroup means perceiving them as a threat. Given 
that most developed contemporary societies are multiethnic, xenophobia can be 
interpreted as tensions induced by multi-ethnic society where ethnically different 
newcomers are visible, making it possible for them to be perceived as an outgroup 
and consequently, as a threat.
According to theories of nation and nationalism, xenophobia is considered as an 
expression of the nationalist ideology. In this theoretical approach, the nation‑state 
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can be interpreted as being conducive to xenophobia toward foreigners because its 
very idea presupposes a constitutive intergroup division between “us” and “others”. 
Consequently, ingroup/outgroup demarcation is natural for the nation‑state and 
its institutional order is a form of social closure (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 1992). 
The belief that the state with its territory and culture belongs to the people who 
have been united into a nation develops a nationalistic ideology with a xenophobic 
worldview, where ethnic migrants are perceived as competitors for collective goods 
of indigenous population such as real rights of political participation and social 
support (Wimmer, 1997).
This statement resonates with a key idea of Blumer’s (1958) the group threat/
competition theory, which claims that within a society there is always a resource 
stress. As a result, access to desired resources is limited and cannot be available 
to all groups. In these circumstances if an outgroup exists, it is perceived as 
a competitor for scarce economic resources and, consequently, as a threat.
However, the physical presence of an ethnically different group is only the 
first step in the causal chain to overt xenophobia. Hjerm and Nagayoshi (2011) 
argue that the size of the minority group per se does not trigger it. What really 
matters is the composition of immigrant population in terms of their cultural origin 
and religious belonging. Accordingly, a large proportion of culturally very distinct 
Muslim immigrants strengthens xenophobia among the majority population of 
European countries, because they are viewed as a threat to values cherished by 
Western peoples.
Taking into account all the above, at this point of analyses one can ask: Does 
the existence of the nation state make xenophobia inevitable? Is it possible to cope 
with the problem of ethnic ingroup/outgroup demarcation?
The role of nation‑state in supporting xenophobic attitudes toward foreigners 
among its citizens examined in studies on national identity and national pride. 
Following the commonly proposed division between ethnic and civic components 
of society, researchers who work in this realm of social science argue that different 
forms of national identity and pride influence people’s attitudes towards “others” in 
different ways.
For example, Smith (1991) suggests dividing national identity into two salient 
patterns: (1) the civic national identity and (2) the ethnic national identity where 
civic identification is assumed to be better than ethnic one because in the first case 
people living in a society can unite under common political rules and values in the 
name of democracy.
Hjerm (1998) goes further and introduces two more types of national identity: 
(3) the multiple national identity, when individuals base their national identity on both 
civic and ethnic factors at the same time, and (4) the pluralistic national identity when 
people have only a weak sense of national identity.
Hjerm concludes that having an ethnic national identity, together with a multiple 
national identity is associated with an increased risk of being xenophobic, while 
having a civic national identity or, being a pluralist, decreases that risk. The same is 
true for national pride. Hjerm divides an individual sense of pride into political (civic 
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dimension) and natio‑cultural (ethnic dimension)2 and demonstrates that the 
political dimension of national pride shows a negative correlation with xenophobia, 
while the natio‑cultural dimension positively correlates with it (Hjerm, 1998, pp. 341, 
344). On the whole, researches on national identity and national pride give empirical 
support to the assumption that to decrease the risk of xenophobia, the separation of 
civic and ethnic in nation‑state is desirable.
Apart from a way of one’s self‑identification and the dimension of national 
pride they have, people’s attitudes toward outgroups are influenced by their 
values. Researches on people’s values linked with their attitudes toward ethnic 
groups provide us with knowledge about some important features of those who 
hold either tolerant or xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. Thus, Leong and 
Ward (2006) demonstrate that only certain cultural values are really conducive to 
xenophobia. According to their findings, these values are uncertainty avoidance, 
power distance, mastery and masculinity. Conversely, individualism and harmony 
can be considered as desirable for a society if it aims to prevent xenophobic 
sentiments among its members.
One more important aspect that theories emphasize is the fact that 
xenophobic discourse receives varying amounts of support over time. Overall, 
the majority of scholars have agreed on two points. Firstly, there are specific 
periods of time when a surge of xenophobia can be easily observed: times of 
economic crises or recession almost always provide a breeding ground for socially 
detrimental outcomes. Secondly, a xenophobic interpretation of social crisis does 
not appeal equally to all members of society. Wimmer (1997) argues that such 
an interpretation is common among downwardly mobile groups, which members 
are dependent on a state support and are most threatened by a loss of their 
social status in times of crisis. Aydin, Kruger, Frey, and Fisher (2013) show that 
economic uncertainties and fear of social and financial decline make particular 
groups of individuals feel social exclusion that, in turn, leads them to displaced 
aggression manifested in intolerance towards minority groups. Taking ideas like 
these into account, Esses, Dovido, Jackson, and Armstrong (2001) developed 
the Instrumental Model of Group Conflict, which demonstrates that xenophobia 
towards foreign migrants is not a general ethnic prejudice but a distinct kind 
of prejudice based on zero‑sum beliefs concerning competition. In other words, 
xenophobia, as a fear of “others”, has a rational nature. In view of the above, 
xenophobia can be considered as a kind of a coping strategy in times of crisis for 
particular groups of people.
To summarize, theoretical and empirical studies reviewed above claim that 
anti‑immigrant attitudes have objective sources and that even though people are 
not averse to immigrants, they may become more or less xenophobic under some 
specific conditions. This manifests itself, for instance, in the so‑called “immigration 
2 Political pride Hjerm interprets as pride in things that constitute civic national identity (political 
institutions of the society, its economy and social security system) and natio‑cultural pride –  as part of 
ethnic understanding of the nation‑state (history, culture, different achievements of people within a certain 
society) (Hjerm, 1998, p. 343).
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dilemma” which means that in hard times of crises members of majority population 
perceive immigrants negatively regardless of whether the newcomers do well in the 
society or not. In the former case, their success may be explained as coming at the 
expense of natives; and in the latter case, immigrants are seen as detrimental to 
national well‑being system (Esses et al., 2001).
Nevertheless, regardless of whether these studies interpret xenophobia as 
an element in a political struggle for collective goods of a nation‑state or a coping 
strategy of those who feel socially excluded in times of economic crises, and whether 
scholars see xenophobia as a function of national identity based on ethnicity or 
a function of particular values shared by individuals in the state, they do not offer 
any clear explanation of how these values and identities are shaped, what changes 
them, and why such changes occur. As a result, the theories provide us with static, 
cognitive explanations of factors underlying xenophobic sentiments among public. 
However, if we want to explain the dramatic surge in support of xenophobic parties 
and the perceived increase of xenophobic sentiments in Western countries requires 
a dynamic theory of value change.
Almost 50 years ago, Inglehart proposed a theory of value change, which holds 
that relatively secure people tend to be more tolerant than less secure ones (Inglehart, 
1971). If people grow up experiencing high levels of existential security (that is, taking 
survival for granted) they tend to hold Postmaterialist and Self‑expression values that 
make them relatively open to change and tolerant of outgroups. On the contrary, if 
people are shaped by existential insecurity during their pre‑adult years, they tend to 
develop Materialist and Survival values that encourage an authoritarian xenophobic 
outlook, strong in‑group solidarity, and rejection of outsiders (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005; Inglehart & Norris, 2004).
Confirming this interpretation, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) find that high levels 
of existential security during one’s formative years leads to an intergenerational shift 
toward self‑expression values, and thus to higher levels of tolerance. This means, 
that at every time point, the younger generations are more Postmaterialist than the 
older ones.
Nevertheless, tolerance levels do not change overnight. In keeping with this 
hypothesis, we would expect to find a time lag between economic development and 
a society’s level of xenophobia. A society’s current level of xenophobia will be more 
accurately predicted by its level of economic development several decades before 
the survey (during the pre‑adult years of the median respondent) than by its level of 
economic security at the time of the survey.
Inglehart and Welzel’s theory of value change also demonstrates the presence 
of clear period effects in response to current economic and social conditions: in time 
of existential insecurity people tend to shift toward more Materialist (Survival) and 
xenophobic views –  and with economic recovery, they shift back toward their long‑
term baseline (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
Accordingly, I hypothesize that existential insecurity is the major cause of 
xenophobic attitudes. This article tests this hypothesis in the Nordic countries that 
simultaneously (1) are among the prosperous in the world, (2) have experienced 
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substantial flows of migrants, and (3) have experienced the rise in support of 
rite‑wing political movements over last decades. All these criteria meet Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, and Finland (in slightly different terms in the context of richness).
The Issue of Immigration and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in the Nordics
The Nordic countries are among the world’s richest. They are renowned for their 
gender and economic equality, high levels of trust, social cohesion, extensive 
welfare programs, powerful unions, relatively low unemployment rates, and so 
on (Mulvand & Stahl, 2015; Booth, 2014). The Nordics sustainably continue to 
flourish, regularly lead the global rankings, be it in education, happiness or quality 
of life, and appear to be centers of innovation. The “Nordic Model” of welfare 
state is an exemplary model of society for many across the world. For decades, 
public has seen these countries as the “quintessential tolerance and human right‑
based” (Armback, 2015).
Recently, however, the international media have reported on the racism and 
hate crimes in Scandinavia that seem to be linked with the rise of right‑wing political 
movements in the region. The Danish Progress Party, the Sweden Democrats, the 
Finns Party and Norway’s Progress Party have all seen their support trend upwards 
in election after election over the past two decades (Appendix, Table 2).
Thus, the results of elections to the National Parliaments show an increase 
in the ratings of support of the Danish People’s Party (a 9‑point increase over 
the last 14 years), Finns (+17 percentage points since 1999), and Sweden 
Democrats (+13 over the last 16 years). Norway’s Progress Party has a relatively 
large number of supporters and has won from 15 to 23 percent of votes over the 
past two decades. The same goes with the elections to the European Parliament. 
The result of the Danish People’s Party in 2014 was improved by 21 percentage 
points in comparison with 1999, the Finns demonstrated a 12‑point increase and 
Sweden Democrats –  a 9‑point increase.
Increasingly, the political climate in the Nordics has been dominated by right‑
wing populist parties that propagate anti‑immigrant and anti‑Muslim rhetoric, and 
ethnically intolerant and violently charged language creeping gradually into the 
mainstream. Thus, Hege Ulstein –  the chief political writer of the Oslo newspaper 
Dagsavisen –  says: “The way people talk about Islam and Muslims here has slowly, 
inch by inch over the years, moved so that things that would have caused total 
outrage 10 years ago only cause mild annoyance today –  things like ‘there is 
something in the Muslim culture that threatens us and we have to send them away’. 
You couldn’t say then, and you hear it in the Parliament and in the newspapers 
now” (Saunders, 2011).
Owing to Ander Breivik atrocities against an “Islamic colonization” in 2011, 
the Norwegian Progress Party came under fire since their strong stance against 
immigration fed xenophobia and might have influenced the terrorist. Norwegian 
politicians at large agreed to tone down in the debates on immigration then, but 
on the eve of scheduled elections, they all shifted back to their common practice 
Olga Iakimova24
of populist rhetoric (Ladegaard, 2013). Thus, a study of Wiggen (2013) based on 
content analyses of academic literature, mainstream media and online discussions 
in Norway before and after 2011 shows that the public debate on immigration is 
fundamentally negative in the country, and xenophobia toward Muslim immigrants is 
visible in the media and everyday life.
Although Sweden remains the only European country where the majority has 
a positive attitude toward non‑EU immigration (European Social Survey, 2017), the 
rise in the popularity of the right‑wing populism fuels xenophobia there as well. 
During 2014, about three hundred attacks on beggars and in Roma camps were 
reported, which is 23 percent higher than a year before. A UN report published in 
2015 highlighted the rise of Afrophobic hate crimes in the country –  1,075 in 2015 
versus 980 in 2014 (Armback, 2015).
The issue of immigration, populist rhetoric and stance against ethnic migrants 
are three factors that unite the four above mentioned right‑wing parties. Their growing 
influence has moved in parallel with the four Nordic countries’ changing population 
composition and their electorates’ attitudes to immigration (Nardelli & Arnett, 2015). 
According to Eurobarometer’s results (European Commission & Eurobarometer, 
2015) immigration is currently seen by Europeans as the most important issue facing 
the EU (38 %). This item is mentioned by half of the population of Denmark (50 %) 
and Sweden (48 %), and the Finns mentioned it as the third most important issue 
facing the EU (24 %). At the same time, immigration remains the most important 
concern at national level only for Denmark, mentioned by 35 % of Danes. It is the 
fourth main nation concern for Swedes (28 %) and only the sixth –  for Finns (6 %).
To summarize, the extraordinary wealthy Nordic countries today all have sizable 
right‑wing populist movements dominated by xenophobic sentiments. Taking 
this into account as an example of welfare chauvinism, currently, the attempts 
are made to tie the relative success of the Scandinavian welfare states with their 
cultural and ethnic homogeneity, and therefore, to demonstrate that the “Nordic 
Model” is inherently racist (Mulvand & Stahl, 2015). For example, National Review’s 
Kevin Williamson, attacking Bernie Sanders for his usage in the political campaign 
ideas of Nordic social democracy, argues that white homogeneity accounts for 
the Scandinavian welfare state and that to save and protect the homogeneity and, 
consequently, the welfare state, the population of these countries has been overtly 
xenophobic toward ethnic migrants: “The nastier of Europe’s anti‑immigrant and 
ethno‑nationalist movements argue that ethnic solidarity is necessary to preserve 
the welfare state…”, or “Nations of Northern Europe were until recently ethnically 
homogenous, overwhelmingly white, hostile to immigration, nationalistic, and frankly 
racist in much of their domestic policy” (Williamson, 2015).
To some extent, it is possible to agree that “welfare chauvinism” is a sort 
of contemporary malaise in the Nordic political climate but the causes of this 
phenomenon cannot be traced to any inherent xenophobia of Scandinavians. As 
is evident from the theoretical analyses presented at the beginning of this article, 
populist and overtly xenophobic parties draw their support from groups of people 
who have become uprooted from relatively secure lives as a consequence of 
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deindustrialization and welfare retrenchment. Moreover, as the preliminary results 
of my study demonstrate, the people of the Nordic countries are not getting more 
xenophobic toward foreign migrants in the course of time. On the contrary, they have 
become more tolerant.
The Dynamic of Xenophobic and Non-Xenophobic Attitudes toward Immigrants 
in the Nordic Countries
Let us measure whether there has actually been an increase in xenophobic attitudes 
in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland by comparing surveys carried out over 
15 years using the data of World Value Survey (WVS). To do so, I combine two 
WVS’s attitudinal indicators that measure xenophobia3 into a scale where “0” means 
tolerant (non‑xenophobic) attitude toward immigrants and “2” means strongly 
xenophobic attitude.
According to the empirical data, the population of the Nordic countries can 
be characterized as relatively tolerant/non‑xenophobic in comparison with other 
European countries. At the same time, depending on the country, from 30 to 80 
per cent of the respondents express a score equal to or higher than “1” (at least 
one xenophobic answer). Moreover, the data distribution in Table 3 exhibits 
a clear overall trend. In all Nordic countries, non‑xenophobic categories showed 
noticeable increases, whereas xenophobic ones –  decreased. In this context, 
it is interesting to look at national distribution of xenophobic/non‑xenophobic 
answers (Appendix, Table 3).
The most tolerant country seems to be Sweden –  with about 74 percent of 
non‑xenophobic answers and only 2 percent of xenophobic in survey 2010–2012. 
Very close to Sweden are two other Nordic countries –  Denmark and Norway, that 
in the end of the 21st century’s first decade not only had very small xenophobic 
populations (4 percent respectively) but also have been demonstrating a trend 
toward decreasing numbers of intolerant citizens during the past twenty years. 
Finland is on the relatively negative side with increasing level of xenophobic attitudes 
from 4 to 14 percent over the last decade.
This brief description shows that xenophobic/non‑xenophobic attitudes toward 
immigrants are dynamic, and differ from each other even in geographically close and 
economically similar countries; secondly, these attitudes have variated during the 
last decade. The reasons require further in‑depth analysis.
The hypothesis that a society’s current level of xenophobia will be more 
accurately predicted by its level of economic development several decades before 
the survey than by its level of development at the time of the survey is counter‑intuitive. 
Normally, the strongest predictor of a phenomenon at time X is an independent 
variable measured shortly before time X; earlier measures will tend to show less 
impact. Because xenophobic attitudes partly reflect deep‑rooted orientations 
3 1) Would not like to have immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors: 1 –  mentioned, 2 –  not mentioned; 
2) When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants: 1 –  agree, 
2 –  neither, 3 –  disagree.
Table 4.
Correlations between a society’s GDP/capita at various times in the past 
and responses to questions about jobs for one’s own nationality and about 
having immigrants/foreign workers as neighbors in the Nordic Countries  
(Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland)
I would not like to 
have immigrants/
foreign workers as 
neighbors
When jobs are 
scarce, employers 
should give priority 
to people of this 
country over 
immigrants
Attitudes toward 
immigrants 
(xenophobic/non‑
xenophobic)
2000 GDP/capita –.002 .112** –.080**
1990 GDP/capita –.001 .117** –.085**
1980 GDP/capita .004 .155** –.114**
Survival/Self‑Expression 
values at the time of survey .217** .353** .367**
** p < 0,01           Source: WVS 2008–2009; Penn World Tables 7.1
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based on the level of security or insecurity that one experiences during one’s pre‑
adult years, these attitudes show sizeable intergenerational differences that reflect 
a country’s conditions several decades before the survey. Preliminary analyses tend 
to support this hypothesis.
The data in Table 4 suggests that people’s attitudes are sensitive to the 
conditions they experienced during their pre‑adult years, producing a time‑lag of 
several decades between society’s attaining high level of economic security, and 
accepting foreigners as neighbors who have equal rights to jobs. Table 4 also 
demonstrates that a society’s level of Self‑expression values at the time of the 
survey is the strongest predictor of its current level of tolerance; a massive body of 
research demonstrates that Self‑expression values themselves reflect the extent, to 
which people are shaped by high level of economic, physical, and social security 
during their formative years –  from one to five decades before the survey (Inglehart, 
1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2018).
To sum up, the massive surge of votes for xenophobic parties in the Nordic 
countries might seem to imply that it reflects an equally massive surge of xenophobic 
attitudes, but this is not the case. Xenophobic attitudes show the opposite trend. 
On the contrary, the surge of xenophobic votes are to a great extent a protest 
vote motivated by the economic decline and unemployment linked with the Great 
Recession, reaction to Euro crises, and crumbling of the welfare state, which 
coincides with unprecedented levels of immigration.
In past decades, a large share of the population of developed countries, 
including Scandinavia, has experienced a decline of real income and the rise of 
income inequality. The Great Recession of 2008–2012 led to heightened insecurity 
and further contributed to a rising sense of xenophobia especially in the countries 
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that experienced large flows of immigration in recent years. In this context, the rising 
support for xenophobic parties in contemporary Nordic politics does not reflect 
increasingly xenophobic mass attitudes. It reflects two analytically distinct, but 
causally related consequences of neoliberal globalization –  mass immigration and 
deterioration of welfare services.
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Table 1. 
Interpretation of xenophobia in some contemporary social theories
Characteristics
related to xenophobia
Theoretical approaches
Group Threat Theories Theories of Nation and Nationalism Social Identity Theories Value Theories
The Theory of Value 
Change
General 
understanding xenophobia as an expression of tensions induced by a multi‑ethnic society
Causes
– resource stress
– cultural dominant 
position of majority
– nation state as such
– ingroup/outgroup 
demarcation
– nationalist ideology
the ethnic dimension 
of individual self‑
definition as a member 
of a larger community
certain cultural 
values (uncertainty 
avoidance, power 
distance, mastery and 
masculinity)
existential insecurity
Triggers
– size and
– composition of the 
minority group
visibility of ethnically 
different newcomers physical presence of ethnic‑minority groups times of existential 
insecurity
times of economic crises/recession
Perceived image of 
minority groups
– competitor for 
scarce resources
– threat to the cultural 
dominant position
threat to collective 
goods “others”/threat
Risk groups groups that compete for scarce resources
downwardly mobile 
groups
socially excluded 
members of society
people who share 
certain cultural values
people who 
experience the 
feeling of existential 
insecurity
Appendix
Table 2. 
Elections results of far-right parties in the Nordic countries
Name of party National Parliament elections year %
European Parliament elections %
1999 2004 2009 2014
Danish People’s Party 200112.0
2005
13.2
2007
13.8
2011
12.3
2015
21.1 5.8 6.8 15.3 26.6
The Finns Party 19991.0
2003
1.6
2007
4.1
2011
19.1
2015
17.7 0.8 0.5 9.8 12.9
Sweden Democrats 19980.4
2002
1.4
2006
2.9
2010
5.7
2014
12.9 0.3 1.1 3.3 9.7
The Progress Party (Norway) 200114.6
2005
22.1
2009
22.9
2013
16.3
2017
15.3 – – – –
Source: National elections (1998‑2017)
Table 3.
The dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants in the Nordic countries
Country/
Wave*:
Non‑Xenophobic %
Country/
Wave*:
Mixed %
Country/
Wave*:
Xenophobic %
(N)
I II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI I II III IV V VI
Denmark 37 – 51 – 61 – Denmark 53 – 41 – 34 – Denmark 11 – 8 – 4 – 4495
Finland 16 17 27 27 24 – Finland 80 71 63 60 62 – Finland 4 12 11 12 14 – 5709
Norway 35 49 – 56 60 – Norway 51 43 – 40 35 – Norway 14 8 – 4 4 – 5517
Sweden 53 68 76 79 69 74 Sweden 41 30 22 20 27 24 Sweden 8 2 2 1 5 2 7421
Source: World Value Survey (1989‑2012) * Wave: I: 1989‑1993; II: 1994‑1999; III: 1999‑2004; IV: 2005‑2007; V: 2008‑2009; VI: 2010‑2012
